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Consumption-Based Taxation at the Business Level:
The Croatian Experience
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Croatia is the first country in the world to implement consumption-based direct taxation aimed at
the individual as well as the business levels. Traditional corporate tax has been replaced by the
so-called "interest-adjusted profit tax", which encompasses the corporate as well as the noncorporate sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of this tax in Croatia with regard to its
neutrality as well as its cost-effectiveness. This tax can be regarded as neutral in terms of
investment, finance, inflation and organizational form. But the imperfections of financial markets
in Croatia still cause distortions between debt and equity capital as well as some distortions
between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. The second efficiency aspect is identified as
more doubtful, because of the relatively high tax expenditure of protective interest and incentive
effects that have not been proven in practice.
Introduction
Use of consumption-based direct taxation (instead of an income-based system) has been
advocated for some time. Some of its most famous proponents were Hobbes, Smith, Mill,
Weber, Marshall, Einaudi, Pigou, Schumpeter, Fisher and, more lately, Kaldor, who first
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implemented it as a supplementary tax in India (1958-1962) and Sri Lanka (1958-1962, 19761978). However, discussions concerning proposals for a consumption concept have recently
reemerged,1 this time supplemented with a parallel consumption-based tax at the corporate level,
which could be uniform for all business entities. Still, Croatia is the first country in the world to
fully accept a consumption concept in the field of direct taxes (personal income tax and profit
taxes).2
This paper concentrates on the enterprise tax. It aims at analyzing efficiency aspects of
this tax in Croatia. In general, there are three commonly used concepts of efficiency in the public
finance literature. The primary definition refers to minimizing distortions in the allocation of
resources caused by taxes. A second use of efficiency is connected with effectiveness and refers
to tax incentives (the incentive is efficient when it accomplishes its purpose at a minimal cost in
revenue). The third use of the term relates to administration and compliance costs. Thus a tax
system is efficient if it collects taxes without large administrative costs to the government and
without large compliance costs to taxpayers.
This paper focuses on the first two concepts regarding the Croatian business income tax.
The former concept is analyzed in the first part of the paper, with the objective of demonstrating
the different aspects of neutrality. The latter concept is analyzed in the second part of the paper,
where the cost of the tax expenditure is presented. It is calculated relative to the conventional
corporate income tax. The objective of the second part of the paper is not only to express the
magnitude and relevance of the cost of this specific investment incentive in Croatia, but also to
assess its possible incentive effects on investment in comparison with the other, possibly more
suitable, forms of investment incentives.
I.

Neutrality of consumption-based tax reform at the enterprise level
It is well known from public finance theory that the "standard" form of direct taxation at
the corporate level (cash-flow tax) possesses the characteristics of investment as well as financial
neutrality (see for instance Pechman, 1980). This is due to immediate expensing (100 per cent
capital allowance), which reduces the marginal effective tax rate to zero and the greatest
advantage of this tax in comparison with the traditional income concept of profit taxation.
This tax system is neutral concerning equity or debt finance. This is not the case with
traditional profit taxation, which favors debt over equity, as well retained earnings over
dividends. In the end, all cash-flow basis are neutral regarding inflation and at the same time
avoids complicated depreciation techniques regarding inflation adjustments. However,
immediate depreciation is disadvantageous from a fiscal point of view and is especially difficult
for transition economies. Hence, alternative approaches are used where the assets are depreciated
over their usefulness, but the neutrality of the tax is preserved. The zero marginal effective tax
rate is accomplished by the deduction of imputed interest, which is equal to the average market
rate of interest.
The business tax model in Croatia almost fully confirms to consumption taxation
principles. Some departures from the model are the result of the difficulty of fully implementing
1
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the theoretical model and due to financial market imperfections. Companies with full profit and
loss accounting based on the balance sheet, are allowed to deduct imputed interest on equity
capital from the tax base. For companies earning the average market rate of return the tax rate is
zero. Income above average profits are taxed, but only on the basis of the difference between
imputed interest (average profits) and remaining profits. In Croatia imputed interest is called
"protective interest", because it protects the normal return on equity from taxation. It taxes only
true "economic profits" and not accounting profits. This leaves minimum capital exempt (Rose,
1998). Since there is no well-developed government bond market in Croatia, which according to
the theoretical models should determine the rate of such an allowance, this protective interest is
now stated at 5%. Figure 1 shows the effects of this allowance on equity.
It is obvious that the exemption of the 5% rate of return from taxation leads to
progressiveness of the Croatian "profit tax". Higher profits (above 5% on equity) lead not only to
higher tax, but also to the higher tax rate. Since this is only due to the indirect progression (5%
equity allowance), it logically follows that it slightly diminishes for higher rates of return.
Likewise, it is sharper for the "lower" rates of return.
Protective interest also has some elements of negative taxation. Firms with accounting
profits can have "tax losses" if profits are lower than 5%. This is not presented in the figure
because it does not effect the effective tax rate of that year, but it should be taken into account
because of loss carry-overs (limited to five years). When the loss is shifted, its amount is
multiplied by the protective interest. If an accounting loss exists, it is even higher because
protective interest is added to the loss. Thus, protective interest shields unsuccessful investments.
As the consumption concept standard requires, investment neutrality is followed by
financial neutrality. Interest deductibility with no additional tax on any form of interest at the
personal level is followed by interest deductibility on equity capital. Hence, there is no advantage
in debt capital. Dividends and retained earnings are treated equally at the company level as well
as at the shareholder level. There is no additional tax at the personal level because all capital
income is exempt from income tax. This causes tax discrimination of human capital investment.
However, this is a “normal” distortion inherent in consumption-based taxation (Bosworth, 1984;
Boyer and Russell, 1995). This distortion exists because the yield on capital investment is tax
exempt, whereas the yield on human capital investment is taxed.
Yet the real world often departs from the assumptions behind financial theory. The
consumption-based tax model assumes, among others things, perfect capital markets with a risk
free rate which is the same for all forms of investment. The Croatian capital market has been
characterized by extremely high interest rates in comparison to the rate of return on equity
capital. This also favors debt capital because interest expense is fully deductible. The limitation
of the interest expense deduction to 5% would formally abolish this discrimination, but
effectively lead to the over taxation. This would additionally enlarge the interest expense burden
of enterprises. On the other hand, interest income at the company level is taxable, so profits
originating from that source are not at a disadvantage. Differences between interest received on
financial assets and paid on debt are recognized for tax purposes.
This imbalance is even more serious when income tax payers are taken into account.
Enterprises that are not obliged to meet all requirements of proper profit and loss accounting are
allowed to use a simplified accounting method. Their profits are then taxed as personal income
tax. Their interest income is tax-free and interest expense is not deductible. They also have the
right to deduct protective interest from their "profits". It is very unrealistic to assume that interest
rates charged on debt are equivalent to interest rates from financial investments and any

difference goes unrecognized for tax purposes. Furthermore, since income from financial
investments in Croatia is much higher than income from real investments, it turns out that the tax
system gives an additional privilege to those who are already market privileged (Those who are
net creditors and earn a higher proportion of their income from financial investments).
Finally, interest adjusted income tax has an important horizontal equity disadvantage in
comparison to the other form of consumption-based tax: the personal expenditure tax. Financial
theory indicates that horizontal equity is here accepted as ex ante and not ex post.3
In Croatia, taxation of above-average capital income occurs only at the company level.
However some capital income is generated only at the individual level. This is especially true for
high capital gains at the individual level in transitional economies, where greater stock market
oscillations and imperfections exist than in developed economies. The authors of the Croatian tax
model (Rose and Wenger, 1992) admitted that they assumed that the capital income of
individuals would more or less be around the “normal” level (officially stated at 5%). This
assumption is justified if we take into account simplicity and efficiency from the point of view of
low compliance and administrative costs, but it has its inevitable neutrality and horizontal equity
distortions.
II.

Tax expenditure of allowance for equity ("protective interest")
The "interest adjusted profit tax" is claimed to be efficient, because of its investment and
financial neutrality. But the other understanding of efficiency (cost-effectiveness), raises
additional questions. In comparison with other countries that do not allow "protective interest"
(allowance for equity), the Croatian budget has an additional cost (revenue loss). Despite the fact
that "protective interest" is an integral part of the consumption-based profit tax system, it can be
regarded as a specific form of tax expenditure. This can be done if we compare it with the
traditional corporate income tax. Although the notion of tax expenditure is now familiar,
definitions of what constitutes a tax expenditure vary substantially in practice (OECD, 1996).
Due to protective interest tax expenditure is calculated relative to the conventional corporate
income tax. As noted, although “protective interest” is an integral part of the chosen
consumption concept in Croatia, it can be regarded as a special allowance as well as a special
general investment incentive in comparison to the “traditional” (corporate) income tax.
An analysis is based on the sorted data from tax returns (Spajić, 1998 and 2000), grouped
according to a positive or negative tax base (taxable profit or "tax loss"). Tax expenditures due to
the "protective interest" are classified as following:



Direct tax expenditure: the tax expenditure that follows from a smaller amount
of tax from enterprises that have a positive tax base (taxable profit), and
Indirect tax expenditure: the tax expenditure from enterprises that have a
negative tax base ("tax loss") due to the loss carry-forward.

The direct tax expenditure is calculated by taking into account companies that have a
positive tax base and pay profit tax in the year. The loss of tax revenue for the government is
calculated by applying the relevant statutory rate of tax to the amount which is deducted from
taxable profit and represents the "protective interest". This protective interest (row 2 in Table 1)
refers only to the protective interest for that year. Furthermore, as already mentioned, tax
3
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expenditure represents the lost tax revenue for companies that had returns on equity higher than
the protective interest for that year. After the deduction of the protective interest a positive tax
base still exists. The tax revenue loss is higher because it should include the lost tax revenue of
companies that had a return on equity which was positive, but lower than the protective interest.
After the deduction of protective interest they had a negative tax base ("tax loss").
The amount of tax expenditure is first expressed as a share of that year's tax in Table 1.
The amount of tax paid is calculated by taking into consideration ultimate taxable profit, which is
lower than taxable profit after protective interest because of the tax losses from previous years.
The relevant tax rate varied from 25% to 35% from 1995 - 98. The protective interest varied
from 3% to 5%. The other share represents the proportion of tax expenditure in the tax calculated
on taxable profit before protective interest. This share shows the relative amount of decrease in
the original tax base due to protective interest for companies that have rates of return on equity
higher than this protective interest. The tax rate in the last row is not the real effective tax rate,
because it is not calculated on accounting profits. It takes into account only the influence of the
protective interest on the tax base.
The absolute tax expenditure is still considerable. Its rise in the second and third year is
the result of the rise in taxable profit before protective interest. However, the considerable rise in
1997 is mostly due to the rise in tax rates and the rate of protective interest. The fall for 1998 is
the result of the fall in taxable profit before protective interest which caused the fall in protective
interest.
The relative tax expenditure ranks from 25-32% of the ultimate profit tax due for that
year. Despite the fact that it is undervalued, this is substantial. The fall in the share for the second
year is caused by the increase in the tax base. The rise in the third year is caused by changes in
the tax law, which influenced the absolute data. The fall for the last year is caused by the fall in
the absolute amount of tax expenditure. The same pattern is reflected in the next calculation of
the share of tax expenditure (% of tax expenditure 2), which does not take into account loss carry
over from previous years and ends with slightly lower results.
The calculation of direct tax expenditure is incomplete because it does not encompass the
influence of protective interest on the higher tax loss (Table 2) and the resulting tax expenditure
in the future. Its calculation is based on protective interest of companies with a negative tax base
and the resulting higher accrued receivables of the tax refund in the future. The amount of
receivables which originates from the tax loss of that year alone is calculated (row 3 of Table 2).
A rate of 35% is applied to the tax loss for 1996, taking into account the announced rise in the
profit tax rate in 1997. The total amount of receivables of tax refund for each year is much higher
because it includes losses carried over from previous years.
The increase in accrued receivables because of protective interest for that year is an
indirect "tax expenditure" for that year. It can be seen as the present value of future tax
expenditures due to the protective interest for the stated year. Its share in the receivables of tax
refund is calculated as follows: increase in accrued receivables of tax refund because of
protective interest / accrued receivables of tax refund or: protective interest / tax loss.
Although the amount of indirect yearly tax expenditure is very high in absolute and
relative terms, it should be taken with precaution. The stated amounts are exaggerated because
there is no indefinite loss carry over period in Croatia. The period is limited to 5 years.
Accordingly, it is highly likely that the substantial amount of accrued receivables for the tax
refund will not be realized. Our data supports this conclusion.

III.

Incentive elements of protective interest
Thus the direct tax expenditure and its share in the profit tax (% of tax expenditure 1)
must be taken into account. It can be said that the stated percentage (29% on average) represents
the exact relative amount of loss in tax revenue which would be collected in the absence of
protective interest. This simple accounting logic neglects the behavioral response (the possible
positive influence of protective interest as an investment incentive). This is the basic
disadvantage of the entire tax expenditure logic and calculation (Rosen, 1999; OECD, 1996).
The "benefit" of this tax expenditure (incentive for investment) is impossible to assess
because it is hard to isolate the influence of the tax factors on the investment decision. This is
especially so in turbulent times when the general economic and political environment is
changing rapidly, as is the case in Croatia.
Investment at the beginning of 2000 still followed a negative trend, even though there
was a certain increase in the first quarter 2001 in comparison with the low level in the last
quarter of 2000. This level of investment is caused by reduced investments by government and
enterprises, as the recession has exhausted their current saving. Simultaneously, the inflow of
foreign capital is limited, while banks are hesitant to grant long-term loans to businesses.
It would be wrong to automatically jump to the conclusion that the (consumption-based)
tax system, with protective interest as its main characteristic, is inefficient in general and that it is
even the main cause for the lack of investment. It is more realistic to support the opinion (se for
instance OECD, 1995; Shah, 1995, McLure, Jr., 1999) that the tax factors (and especially
investment tax incentives) do not play a major role in attracting investments. Other factors, such
as legal, political, institutional, infrastructural as well as other economic factors are much more
significant. If they are negative, they can severely constrain the possible positive effect of tax
incentives.
Furthermore, the elimination of non-tax disincentives for investment is more important
that the existence of tax incentives. But this means that the preconditions for the effectiveness of
tax incentives must be created. Again, it will be hard to isolate its positive influence from other
factors.
Despite the prevailing negative attitude, especially the OECD and IMF, towards tax
incentives for investment, such incentives have increased substantially in range and scope since
the 1980s. Especially in transition economies, which gradually abandoned them in the period
1992 to 1995, tax incentives are again being introduced.
If we consider the recommendations concerning the “preferable forms” of tax incentives
(Boadway and Shah, 1995; Mintz and Tsiopoulos, 1995; Shah, 1995; Holland and Owens 1997;
Genser, 1999; McLure, 1999), protective interest could be claimed to have some "disadvantages"
from the point of view of efficiency regarding cost-effectiveness. Tax incentives that apply only
to new capital and are up front (payable when investment is undertaken) are likely to be more
effective.4
Protective interest can be claimed to have some similar disadvantages as a general profit
tax rate reduction. It applies constantly to the whole equity capital and not only to the new
investment giving a windfall gain to owners of old capital. This also means lower tax revenue for
the government in comparison with an investment tax credit or allowance. On the other hand, it
does not have up front characteristics. The positive effects for entrepreneurs occur gradually in
(all) future years of business. This implies uncertainty for the expected future benefits. This is
4

For instance (refundable) tax credits and tax allowances as well as full expensing. The latter is not compatible with
protective interest, it can only be substituted for it.

particularly true of transition economies, where, unfortunately, political and economic instability
is still an important element. Such a form of tax incentive also gives rise to expected increases in
the profit tax burden in the future. In the end, there is a lack of further targeting possibilities,
besides the stated lack of targeting to new investment.
Only time will tell whether the first implementation of a consumption-based tax system at
the enterprise level will be effective in comparison to its costs and whether it will survive calls
for its replacement by a more up front and targeted incentive procedure. Perhaps refundable
investment tax credits or allowances would be preferable.
IV.

Conclusion
An interest adjusted profit tax in Croatia is efficient with respect to neutrality, but this
formal neutrality is jeopardized by the absence of perfect financial market in Croatia. There is
still a distortion between debt and equity capital as well as between the corporate and noncorporate sectors. The efficiency of such a system in the sense of cost-effectiveness is doubtful,
mostly because of the high tax expenditures of protective interest. The direct part of this tax
expenditure is around 30% of potential revenue from the profit tax in Croatia. The potential
effectiveness of protective interest could not be tested because of the predominance of the
negative non-tax factors. Still, if it is found necessary to have tax incentives for investment, it
seems that more "up-front" procedures and incentives that are limited to new capital would be
more efficient.
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Figure 1
Tax Burden on the Real Rate of Return of Business Investment in Croatia
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Table 1

Tax expenditure for Croatian companies with a positive tax base
(HRK Thousand)

1995
Taxable profit before
protective interest
Protective interest
Taxable profit after
protective interest
Profit tax1
Tax
expenditure
because of protective
interest
% of tax expenditure
12
% of tax expenditure
23
Statutory tax rate
"Effective" tax rate4

1996

1997

1998

7,543,634
2,185,215

10,792,653
2,503,980

13,198,914
3,749,785

12,928,385
3,233,554

5,358,419
1,271,018

8,288,673
1,873,736

9,449,129
2,764,810

9,694,831
2,907,147

546,304

625,995

1,312,355

1,131,744

30.06
28.97

2.85
23.20

32.19
28.41

28.02
25.01

25.00
17.76

25.00
19.20

35.00
25.05

35.00
26.25

1

Calculated taking into consideration ultimate taxable profit.
Tax expenditure because of protective interest that year / (ultimate profit tax + tax expenditure
because of protective interest that year).
3
The share of tax expenditure in profit tax calculated on taxable profit before protective interest
or protective interest / taxable profit before the protective interest.
4
(Taxable profit after protective interest x statutory tax rate) / taxable profit before protective
interest.
2

Source: Data obtained from profit tax returns (Ministry of Finance-Croatia) according to Spajić
1998 (for 1995 and 1996) and Spajić 2000 (for 1997 and 1998)); other relative data: author’s
calculation.

Table 2

Tax expenditure for Croatian companies with a negative tax base
(HRK Thousand)

1995
Tax
loss
before
protective interest
Protective interest
Tax
loss
after
protective interest
Accrued receivables
of tax refund
Increase of accrued
receivables because of
protective interest
% of tax refund
increase1
1

1996

1997

1998

8,791,888
4,705,444

11,425,333
5,707,479

10,565,401
8,874,643

16,028,188
6,502,909

13,497,332

17,132,812

19,440,044

22,531,097

3,374,333

5,995,434

6,804,015

7,886,233

1,176,361

1,997,611

3,106,125

2,276,018

53.52

49.92

84.00

40.59

Protective interest / Tax loss before protective interest.

Source: See Table 1; last three rows: author’s own calculations.

